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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN EAST AFRICA PROJECT 
 
CASE STUDY:  TAXATION IN MALAWI  
1. Introduction 
The attainment of democratic governance requires that the institutions of governance abide 
by various constitutional and administrative law principles that further transparency, 
openness, accountability and the rule of law. With regard to administrative law, the principles 
of legality, reasonableness, and procedural fairness in rule-making, implementation and 
adjudication ensure that the quality of decision making furthers democratic governance. The 
case study focuses on an administrative agency that is responsible for collecting revenue in 
Malawi, the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). The agency has been given powers under 
law to make and apply rules, investigate and adjudicate disputes. The Agency interacts 
directly with the citizenry and makes decisions that affect the general populace. It is therefore 
pertinent that the revenue agency abides by administrative law principles in the exercise of its 
powers and conduct of functions to promote good governance.   
 
It is noted that the implementation of revenue laws by the Malawi Revenue Agency raises 
pragmatic challenges that relate to the effective implementation of administrative law 
principles. With regard to agency rule making, the issues of concern relate to the balance 
between technocratic autonomy and meaningful engagement of the general citizenry in rule 
making; a balance between technical and political decision making and meaningful 
engagement with the citizenry in the light of the complexity of revenue laws. With regard to 
rule implementation, issues of concern relate to how the agency ensures that there is 
meaningful engagement in rule implementation and whether there is demand for good 
governance in revenue administration by the general citizenry in this democratic era in 
Malawi. With regard to adjudication, the issues of concern relate to how the Agency protects 
the privacy of an individual tax payer and ensure that there is public participation in 
adjudication process to advance accountability, the plethora of adjudicating bodies and how 
the general public engages with the various mechanisms. There is dearth of literature on 
rulemaking, implementation and adjudication practices of the Malawi Revenue Authority and 




2. Administrative Law and Taxation in Malawi: Background and 
Context 
 
2.1 Pre-colonial and Colonial Period and the Administration of Tax 
The section presents a historical context of taxation during the pre- colonial, colonial and post 
colonial period. The focus is on the extent to which revenue rule-making, implementation and  
adjudication processes were inclusive of administrative law principles to further good 
governance in the different historical periods. There is dearth of information on the history of 
taxation in Malawi during the pre-colonial period (i.e., before 1891). Oral history, however, 
reveals that locals were paying some form of taxes to Tribal Chiefs who in turn provided 
them security from other invading tribes.1 
Malawi was later colonised by the British after they had declared it a British Protectorate in 
1891. During this colonial period (1891-1964), there was a form of tax called Hut Tax.2 The 
British Commissioner, Sir Harry Johnston, used local chiefs who collected the tax through 
messengers.3 However, the atmosphere under which this was done seems to have been an 
unhappy one, unilaterally-imposed, and devoid of public participation in policy-making. 
Baker stipulates that: 
‘the British Commissioner “was a persuasive talker and was prepared to use force to 
“pacify” the country” and that ‘the collection of hut taxes was one of the evils [as] the 
messengers ill-treated the people. If any person delayed in bringing out his money he 
was tied up with his arms around his back. He was untied only if his wife and friend 
paid the amount due. Sometimes part of the money was stolen by the messengers….If 
any of those who were robed dared which was heavily resisted by the locals as it was 
seen as a tool for oppression. In the 1890s, to go near the collector to complain was 
pushed away and beaten up by the messengers. If a person showed any sign of 
                                                          
1 Chiumya, C. 2006: “Counteracting Tax Evasion in Malawi: An Analysis of the Methods and a Quest for 
Improvement”, International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Munich Personal RePEC Archive (MPRA), 
19 May, 2005 
2 A hut had three people and the annual tax was at six shillings per it 
3 Baker, C. 1975: “Tax Collection in Malawi: an Administrative History”, 1891-1972, International Journal of 




resistance to pay tax, even if such resistance should have somewhat been justified, 
then “some harsh methods-burning huts, manacling, and arresting wives-were used.’4 
It is evident that the revenue rule-making processes were the sole domain of the executive 
and the citizenry was not given opportunity to bargain or participate in tax issues. However, it 
is also evident in this regard that there was a demand for good governance by the general 
populace as such forms of oppression were heavily resisted and there was no compliance. 
Such resistance was met by punitive sanctions. 
By late 1930s, there was a change in the administration of tax as District Administrators 
oversaw tax collection and fostered its compliance. The District Administrators delegated 
their power to other personnel who did the actual collecting at various fora: 
‘Tax clerks were stationed at markets and places of employment [and there was] 
constant checking on censuses and on the possession of tax receipts, tax drives, many 
of which were planned with the care of a military operation using district and native 
authority messengers, tax clerks and census clerks…to bring in as much as possible.’5 
In 1963, however, the colonial government, realising that the Hut Tax had been inequitable, 
seeing as it had been levied without regard for wealth or ability to pay, passed the Income 
Tax Ordinance6 in which the local government integrated Africans in the system. However, 
in that piece of legislation penalties were retained and exemptions generally restricted. 
Therefore, it is arguable that the change which the Ordinance brought was just a minimal one, 
if at all. Yet, it is remarkably notable that the integration of Africans into the system can be 
equated to affording African representation hitherto non-existent. 
 
2.2 Independence Era (1964- 1994) and Tax Administration 
Malawi got its independence on 6th July, 1964. However, it appears that, although it now 
attained independence, it simply inherited the already-administratively-flawed colonial 
government which was characterised by lack of public participation and not much was 
improved. During this era, the responsible institution in administering tax was the 
Departments of Customs and Excise and Income Tax. It is noted that decisions on tax were 
                                                          
4 Supra 
5 Ibid., p. 58 
6 Ordinance No. 19 of  1962 (Zomba, 1963) 
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just being imposed on taxpayers. Comparing the colonial regime with that of Dr Banda, it is 
stated that: 
‘The colonial period was characterised by paternalistic rule by the British colonial 
power. At independence, Prime Minister Banda took over this authoritarian system. 
Rather than trying to modify it substantially, he kept himself at the pinnacle and 
quickly installed a highly personalistic neo-patrimonial regime.’7 
Supportive to that view is the observation that after independence, Malawi inherited a tax 
system in which personal and income taxes provided tax revenue.8 Consequently, the people 
did not have a say in policy-making issues (which inevitably includes tax issues) under the 
one-party regime.9 Banda’s Malawi exemplified the personal dictatorship in which he took 
exclusive charge of policy-making and implemented instructions through personal 
emissaries.10 On the same token, it has been stated that: 
‘Banda’s regime, though far from the most oppressive in the twentieth century 
African history, was nevertheless one in which the state security apparatus enforced 
the power of a dictator and his elite with considerable ruthlessness.’ 11 
One wonders therefore if, in such a dictatorial state of affairs, the taxpayer would confidently 
have any input in matters of taxation. There is a measure of doubt in that regard. In 1968, the 
Taxation (Amendment) Act12  was passed which attempted to provide “a firm base from 
which more vigorous collection can be pursued [since] many who can pay are avoiding their 
responsibility and [therefore] must expect severe penalties than in the past”13 and “persistent 
defaulters were to be imprisoned”.14 But what is surprising is that the taxpayers were not 
                                                          
7 Stephen Brown in Shadrack Wanjala Nansong’o, Ed. The African Search for Stable Forms  of Statehood: 
Essays in Political Criticism (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), pp187-227 
8 Zmarak Shalizi and Wayne Thirsk “Policy, Research, and Eternal Affairs”, Working Papers, Public 
Economics, Country Economics Department, The World Bank, August 1990, WPS 493, p2 
9 The other author being Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transition in Africa.” World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1994), pp.453-89 
10Note 28, supra. 
11 P. Sturges, 1998. “The Political Economy of Information: Malawi under Kamuzu Banda, 1964-1994”. 
International Information and Library Review, 30, p2 
12 No. 2 of 1968 (Zomba, 1968) 
13 Colin Baker, “Tax Collection in Malawi: an Administrative History, 1891-1972”, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, vol. 8, No. 1 (1975), p. 60, http://www.jstor.org/stable/217485, accessed: 30-05-2016 
1920 UTC, citing Hansard, Malawi Parliament, Sixth Session, Second Meeting, December 1968 (Zomba, 1968), 
216-217 
14 Ibid., p60 
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being consulted at all to have their input ushered in, despite the fact that they were the ones to 
shoulder the burden when “the rate of tax was raised by twenty-five percent”.15 This was so 
despite the observation that the increase was more than many taxpayers were able or prepared 
to pay (Baker, 1975) and, as seen, this Act determined more positive means for dealing with 
defaulters, thereby having the probability of adversely affecting the taxpayers. 
 
2.3 The Democratic Era and the Institutional Framework of the 
Malawi Revenue Authority 
 
In 1994, Malawi embraced multiparty democracy which saw the development of the new 
constitutional order that advocates for good governance in all matters that affect the 
citizenry.16 The Constitution also provides for the right to administrative justice.17 In matters 
of revenue, the constitution clearly provides that no tax, rate, duty, levy or imposition shall be 
raised, levied or imposed by or for the purposes of the Government or any local government 
authority otherwise than by or under the authority of the law.18 There must therefore be 
regard to good governance principles and administrative justice in matters of revenue. 
Consequently, there are structural and institutional reforms that were made to tax 
administration which saw the creation of the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA).  
The Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) is a body corporate created under section 3 of the 
Malawi Revenue Authority Act.19 The agency was instituted with the aim of curing the 
administrative flaws of the former departments with a view to enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of revenue collection.20In terms of its structural composition, the Agency is 
headed by the Commissioner General and the Deputy Commissioner, themselves appointed 
by the Board of the Malawi Revenue Authority.21 It should however be noted that various 
departments exist in the MRA which are headed by Revenue Commissioners and Directors.  
                                                          
15 ibid 
16 Section 12 of the Constitution provides for fundamental principles that embody the rule of law, accountability 
, openness and transparency 
17 Section 43 of the Constitution 
18 Section 171 of the Constitution 
19 Cap 39: 07 of the Laws of Malawi. 
20 Report by Centre for Social Concern: Study of Malawi Taxation System 
21 See section 15 of the Malawi Revenue Authority Act which creates the Board, gives instructions on the 
management, performance and operational policies of the revenue department. 
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MRA is mandated to assess, collect and receive specified revenue22 required by the law. It is 
also responsible for the enforcement of tax laws on behalf of the State.23 It is also the MRA 
that is responsible for the administration of the tax laws and the promotion of voluntary tax 
compliance.24  
MRA is further responsible for proposing measures on how to counteract tax fraud and forms 
of fiscal evasion and to take such measures as may be required to improve the standards of 
service given to taxpayers with a view to improving efficiency, effectiveness and 
maximization of revenue collection.25Further, the Agency gives advice to the Minister of 
Finance on matters of revenue policies, administration and collection. Being an Agency of 
the State, MRA is accountable to, and operates, under the general supervision of the Ministry 
of Finance. It therefore follows that the executive arm of the government, through the 
Ministry of Finance, is responsible for proposing changes to tax laws and is the custodian of 
the tax policy.  
The law has also given extensive powers to MRA. Section 5 of the MRA Act empowers it to 
study revenue laws and identify necessary amendments which may be made to any law in a 
bid to improve the administration of, and compliance with, revenue. It is further empowered 
to study the administrative costs and the operational impact of the intended legislative 
changes, to collect and process statistics needed to provide forecast of revenue receipts. More 
importantly, the MRA is given wide discretion to take such other measures as the authority 
deems necessary or desirable in a quest to effectuate the general aspirations of the provisions 
in the MRA Act. Being at the pinnacle of the MRA, the Commissioner General has vast 
discretionary powers in taxation governance and is empowered to appoint the Revenue 
Commissioners. The Commissioner General also plays a key role in the rule-making 
processes by the MRA.  
The MRA also acts as an adjudicative body on various complaints pertaining matters under 
the Taxation Act,26  the Customs and Excise Act,27 and the Value Added Tax Act.28 
                                                          
22 In this connexion, as interpreted under section 2 of the MRA act, revenue includes taxes, duties, fees and fines 
imposed or collected under the written laws. 
23 See section 4(1) of the MRA Act.  
24 See section 4(2) of the MRA Act. 
25 Note 31, supra. 
26 Cap 41: 01 of the Laws of Malawi 
27 Cap 42: 01 of the Laws of Malawi 
28 Cap 42: 02 of the Laws of Malawi 
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Complaints relate to non-taxable income, exemption from income tax, deductions on 
allowances, amount of duty payable over imported goods and the amount of Value Added 
Tax to be paid. In that connexion, there exist various complaints’ systems and procedures.  
Any decision made under the tax law, therefore, is appealable to other bodies created for the 
purposes of adjudication and, finally, to the courts of law. 
A study that focused on the extent of citizen participation in tax administration in Malawi 
noted that the current institutional framework has improved tax administration in theory but 
in practice it still mirrors the administrative flaws of the past: 
‘Under Banda, Malawi knew three decades of brutal dictatorship. However, many 
autocratic practices and other problems of the past still remain, though often in a new 
form. The poor majority may speak, but are not heard. They are still largely excluded 
from participating not by armed thugs and repressive laws, but by a lack of 
institutional mechanisms of representation and participation.’29 
It has further been observed that citizens are not involved in the discussion of tax issues in 
Malawi: 
‘Civil society, private sector, donors and government often have different interests in 
tax debate. The unfortunate fact is that the citizens are almost always outside the 
discussion, largely due to the perceived complexity of issues to do with taxation, or 
the perceived low levels of influence that they have. The fact remains though that 
taxes being mandatory, it is the same citizens that pay directly or indirectly.’ 30 
This invariably means that there is still a fundamental lack of taxpayer participation in tax 
matters on the one hand; and lack of transparency and accountability by tax governors, on the 
other.  The current study then focuses on understanding the rule-making, implementation and 
adjudication practices of the Malawi Revenue Authority and the nature and form of citizenry 
participation in these processes. The focus is on how good governance is promoted through 
adherence to principles of administrative law. 
 
                                                          
29 Stephen Brown in Shadrack Wanjala Nansong’o, Ed. The African Search for Stable Forms  of Statehood: 
Essays in Political Criticism (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), pp187-227 
30Collins Magalasi, “Unmasking the Malawi Taxation System”, Consultancy Report For Malawi Economic 
Justice Network, April 2009, p28 
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3. Research Objectives and Methodology 
 
3.1 Study Objectives 
• To determine how the Malawi Revenue Authority make rules, apply rules and 
adjudicate disputes 
• Establish the nature and  forms of public participation in rule making and application 
and adjudication of disputes 
• Determine the role and impact of judicial review, parliamentary and presidential 
oversight on agency functions 
3.2 Research Questions 
• How does the Malawi Revenue Authority make rules, apply rules and adjudicate 
disputes 
• What is the nature and forms of public participation rule making, application and 
adjudication of disputes 
• What is the role and impact of judicial review, parliamentary and presidential 
oversight on agency functions 
 
3.3 Study Design and Approach 
The study research sites were selected through purposive sampling of relevant areas that 
would assist in achieving the study objectives. It was considered that the appropriate research 
site on decisions on taxation would be the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). Its 
headquarters is located in Blantyre, Southern Region of Malawi. This is where policy level 
and final decisions are made and where the tribunal is also housed. With regards to 
operational level decisions, specifically how the actual operations affect people, two main 
importing routes were identified namely Blantyre main port in the Southern Region and 
Songwe Boarder in the Northern Region of Malawi. The Northern Region was chosen also 
because of its distance from the central office; the further away the boarder the wider the 
discretion. As such, it would be a good area to base the research and study how discretion is 
exercised in the implementation of revenue laws. Kamuzu International Airport, the biggest 
airport in Malawi, and the side entry border post called Biriwiri in Ntcheu were also selected 
as being relevant to the research. It was expected that the urban and rural divide will present a 




3.4 Research Data Tool for Qualitative Research 
Key Informant Interviews were conducted in all the four main stations. At the Malawi 
Revenue Authority Headquarters offices, interviews were conducted with the 
Commissioners, Directors and officers in the Customs and Excise Division, Domestic Tax 
Divisions, Legal Affairs Department, Policy Planning Division and Tax Investigations 
Division. At the Blantyre main station, interviews were conducted with the Station Manager, 
Customs Agents and clients. At the Songwe Border Post, Interviews were conducted with the 
Station Manager, Stations Supervisors, Station Clerks, Clearing Agents and customers whose 
offices are also located at the Border Station. At Kamuzu International Airport, interviews 
were conducted with the Station Manager and Station Supervisors. The officials in the Policy 
Department at the Ministry of Finance were also consulted. 
 It was also considered relevant, through reference in the interviews, to include Non-
Governmental Organisation and interviews were conducted with the Malawi Economic 
Justice Network (MEJN) which engaged government on revenue matters. Interviews were 
also conducted with other private citizens. The interviews elicited insights into the rule 
making processes, rule implementation and adjudication of disputes and the extent of public 
participation in the processes. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The data was analysed through content and discourse analysis methods. The tool of analysis 
identified recurrent themes and analysed them in the light of administrative law principles of 
legality, procedural fairness and irrationality. The tool required the identification of key 
actors in rule making, implementation and adjudication processes and how this relates to the 
principles of legality, irrationality and procedure propriety. Processes and mechanisms that 
are involved in rule making, implementation and adjudication were identifies and analysed in 
the relation to legality, procedural propriety and irrationality principles. The nature and form 
of public participation was analysed in the light of direct and indirect participatory theories. 
The Impact of Judicial Review, Parliamentary and Executive oversight on agency functions 




4. Research Findings 
 
4. 1 Rule- Making 
Rule -making is a process that an agency uses to formulate rules, implement and interpret the 
law that the Agency administers.31 The definition entails that there are three aspects of rule-
making namely: rule formulation, rule/law implementation and rule/law interpretation. MRA 
administers the following statutes: the Taxation Act, the Customs and Excise Act and the 
Value Added Tax Act. The rule-making function involves the drafting of rules, interpreting 
the revenue laws into digestible material for ease of application, drafting informal rules and 
engaging stakeholders in rule formulation.  
Administrative agencies are sometimes given legislative functions to make laws/rules.32 
Section 5 of the MRA Act empowers the agency to study revenue laws and identify 
amendments which may be made to any law for the purpose of improving the administration 
of and compliance with revenue. MRA is further empowered to study the administrative 
costs, compliance costs and the operational impact of intended legislative changes.33 In the 
year 2013, MRA made the Income Tax (P.A.Y.E) (Deductions and Payment) and 
(Information Rules) and the Customs and the Excise (Amendment) Regulations of 
2013.Further, in 2014, the Agency proposed a 3 % withholding tax which is now operational.  
In that regard, the Agency participates indirectly in the formulation of legislation through 
coordinating with the Ministry of Finance.  
It should be noted that administrative law governs the law/rule- making functions of revenue 
agencies.34  In the case of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v United 
States35, the court rejected the idea of tax exceptionalism and approved that the general 
administrative law principles are equally applicable to tax administration. The principles of 
legality, rationality and procedural fairness of the actors, roles, processes and mechanism that 
are involved in the rule making and legislative functions are interrogated to determine the 
extent to which they promote democratic governance.  
                                                          
31 Gellhorn, E. et al, 2006, Administrative law and process in a Nutshell. 5th ed. West Publishing Co. USA 
32 Hoexter, C. et al 2002. The New Constituional and Administrative law. Vol 2 JUTA Law. A number of terms 
are used for this kind of legislation such as regulations, proclamations, rules, orders, declarations, directives, 
decrees and schemes 
33 Section 5 of the MRA Act 
34 (Professor Grewal, 2014) in Taking Administrative Law to Tax, Duke Law Journal, Volume 63,  Number 8, 
May 2014 
35 131 S. ct. 704(2011) 
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4. 2.1 Legality in Rule- Making 
The concept of legality considers whether the agency in its law/rule- making functions has 
acted within the law thus not exceeding its powers (ultra vires).36 Thus, it is important that 
the Malawi Revenue Authority operates within the framework of the Constitution and the 
revenue laws to further democratic governance. The research considered the legality of both 
actors who are involved and processes and mechanisms that are followed in rule- making. 
The research findings are that MRA is the only key institution that is involved in revenue 
rule-making and rule interpretation. Specifically, the Technical Department in the Customs 
and Excise Division, based at the Headquarters in Blantyre, is responsible for the 
administration and interpretation of the Customs and Excise Act. The exercise involves 
developing forms that aid the effective implementation of the Act. The Inland Revenue 
officers, Border Station officers and Customs Agents do not take part or participate in rule 
interpretation as they belong to the Operations Department within the Customs Division. 
Further, the Domestic Tax Division, based at the Headquarters in Blantyre, is responsible for 
interpreting the Taxation Act and the Value Added Tax Act. The implementation of the rules 
is done by different officers who are also based at the Headquarters. 
With regard to law-making, the Policy and Planning, Legal Affairs, Customs and Excise and 
Domestic Taxes Divisions within MRA participate in law making in a delegated capacity as 
the MRA is an agent of the Ministry of Finance. The divisions propose new tax laws or 
amendments to existing laws which are then forwarded to the Ministry of Finance.  The 
rationale is that the Ministry of Finance facilitates the adoption of new rules especially those 
that come in the form of statutory instruments. The Ministry of Finance further performs the 
law-making function independent of the input from the Revenue Agency The Ministry 
develops policies relating to tax and engages various stakeholders when coming up with 
revenue laws.37 The Ministry then makes the ultimate decision on which proposals to carry 
forward to Parliament. Within the Ministry of Finance, the Revenue Department is involved 
in drafting the final proposed laws or amendments and coordinates with the Ministry of 
Justice. 
Further, members of the general public do participate in revenue law-making through 
consultations during pre-budget consultation sessions led by the Ministry of Finance. 
Proposals or amendments to new laws are also discussed through the same consultations. 
                                                          
36 The State v DPP and Lilongwe CRM ex parte Chilumpha Miscellaneous Cause No. 315 of 2005 
37 The Consultations target the specific groups of stakeholders who are likely to be affected by the decision 
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Further certain sectors of the population, such as traders or professional bodies, are consulted 
in rule making where a decision on tax law will affect them. The other actors who are 
involved in rule making are various stakeholders from public institutions as well as private 
institutions. Their main role is to input into the rule making process of the tax administration. 
Some of the stakeholders who were mentioned are Society of the Public Accountants, NGOs 
such as MEJN, traders, industries, government ministries such as the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, associations and sometimes the general public.  
The analysis on the legality of actors evidences that actors that are involved in law and rule- 
making are from within MRA and hence authorised by revenue laws. However, certain key 
actors are not included in the law/rule making processes viz officers who are outside the 
MRA headquarters such as Border Stations and the Inland Revenue offices. The outside 
officers reported that they are just given the rules to implement and are not asked to input into 
the process. One would have thought that due to the fact that those who are not stationed at 
headquarters are the ones who mostly implement the rules and receive feedback or 
complaints from clients, they would be very much suited to input in the process of 
rulemaking. Further, members of the general do not effectively participate in the law making 
processes as the pre-budget consultation processes are held regionally.38 There are also no 
mechanisms that have been put in place to ensure that women and ordinary citizens in 
Malawi participate in the revenue law/rule making processes. It is also noted that members of 
the general public are totally excluded from the internal rule- making function and are not 
consulted in rule interpretation. Whilst key actors are involved in rule- making, the exclusion 
of other stakeholders and the limitations that have been placed on other actors do not further 
good democratic governance. 
With regard to the legality of processes and mechanism in rule- making,39 the research 
findings are that the processes and mechanisms that are followed are internally driven and 
involve only MRA and the Ministry of Finance. The MRA Act and revenue laws give the 
Commissioner General a wide discretion which can be said to empower the Commissioner to 
make such type of rules.40 The rules are more informal and they do not go to parliament for 
approval and others have been termed as ‘quasi legislation41.’ Examples of these regulations 
                                                          
38 In Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu thus excluding 23 districts in Malawi. 
39 which includes codes of practice, policies, guidelines, regulations and procedures mostly on how to 
administer and collect and enforce tax, 
40 See section 4 of the MRA Act  
41 Leyland, P. 2009. 89. 
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include: the Air Traffic Code42 and the Temporary Importation Code which was prepared by 
the Customs and Excise Division within MRA.  The processes and mechanisms that are 
involved in rule formulation or interpretation are sector-led hence diverse. The Customs and 
Excise Divisions interpret the Customs and Excise Act by developing customs forms and 
regulations through the use of their internal technical department. In other instances, an issue  
is noted by a division, such as the Legal Affairs Department or Tax Investigation Unit or 
Customs and Excise, within MRA. A study is then conducted that considers the revenue, 
economic and social impact of the proposed law or rules. A decision is then made to 
formulate a rule that is later implemented by a concerned division. 
With regard to law-making, the processes and mechanisms followed are both internally and 
externally driven. The internal processes involve MRA proposing an amendment to the tax 
laws that impede on the effective administration of tax. Specifically, the Legal Affairs 
Department will formulate the rules and engage the policy department on the social and 
economic implications of the proposed amendment or new revenue law. Within MRA, 
research is done widely to learn from the practices within the region and internally from the 
concerned departments. The draft law is then sent to the Ministry of Finance for approval and 
further processing. Further, the Executive arm of the State (Malawi) each year revises all 
types of taxes and this revision has to be finally approved by Parliament. The mandate to 
formulate the law is on the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance takes the initiative 
of proposing changes to tax laws without consulting MRA. Examples given include that of 
the removal of duty for importation of minibuses in the 2014-15 financial year and removal 
of tax on electricity.  In certain instance the Ministry of Finance collaborates with the MRA 
to draft proposed tax laws. The Legal Affairs Department within MRA drafts the proposed 
rules which are then forwarded to the Ministry of Finance for approval. The Ministry of 
Finance consults with the Ministry of Justice to perfect the rules. When the Ministry is 
satisfied, the draft rules are sent to parliament for approval. The Ministry of Finance has a lot 
of powers in the final outcome of tax rules. 
Some reforms to tax laws are externally driven by various stakeholders who will engage the 
Commissioner General directly and their concerns are referred to the Ministry of Finance. An 
example was given of Minibus Owners Association which proposed that there be a reduction 
in import duty on minibuses. MRA was then responsible for studying the feasibility of the 
                                                          
42 The Air Traffic Code provides for airport procedures and is also meant among others to regulate the collection 
of taxes in airports. 
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proposal and recommend to the Ministry of Finance. It is noted that the external mechanisms 
advances citizen participation in rule making processes and promotes democratic governance. 
However, only robust concerned groups have used the mechanisms as it is not easy for the 
ordinary citizens in Malawi to engage directly with the MRA. Further, it is also not plausible 
to state the legitimacy of such processes without clear guidelines under the law.  
The analysis on the legality of processes and mechanisms evidences that the revenue laws do 
not specify the exact processes and procedures that are to be followed in the formulation and 
interpretation of revenue laws. The gap makes it very difficult to determine the legality of the 
processes and mechanisms that are followed in practice.  It is also noted that the processes are 
fragmented, sector-led within MRA and diverse.  The multiplicity of processes of rule 
making do not allow for any form of participation by the general citizenry. Hence, there is no 
engagement with the public in administrative rule-making processes. The analysis further 
evidences that there is technocratic autonomy in revenue rule making as only the internal 
technical departments in MRA are involved in rule making and they do not involve any 
outside stakeholders. The general perception at MRA is that rule-making is a technical 
exercise that is best undertaken by the Agency alone. The informants further indicated that 
tax laws are very complex and it may not be prudent to engage members of the public on 
their formulation. Thus, general technical incompetence is assumed on the citizenry and 
hence hampering good governance. The paper recommends that the MRA engages with the 
general public in rule-making whilst retaining the powers to oversee that the rule 
interpretation accords with the general revenue laws. 
With regard to statutory rules, it is noted that the there is a lot of deference to the Ministry of 
Finance in revenue law-making by the Legislature. However, the Ministry of Finance, in its 
executive law-making function does not effectively consult members of the general public. 
Further, there is technocratic autonomy in revenue law-making as it is generally considered 
that members of the general public may not have the technical competency in revenue 
matters. The legislative oversight that attains in parliament during the presentation of revenue 





4. 2.2 Procedural Fairness in Rule-Making 
The concept of procedural fairness is expanded under section 43 of the Republic of Malawi 
Constitution. The provision states that every person shall have the right to lawful and 
procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where 
his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected or threatened; and 
to be furnished with reasons, in writing, for administrative action where his or her rights, 
freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected. In the case Viola and another –v- 
the Attorney General 43  the court stated that a decision has to be assessed as to whether the 
process followed in making it are procedurally proper. 
The process of procedural fairness embodies the cardinal rules of natural justice vis. the right 
to be heard and avoidance of likelihood of bias when making a decision. It is noted that the 
MRA has a duty to ensure that they abide by procedural fairness in their rule making 
functions. Further, the Agency has the mandate of ensuring that legitimate expectations are 
respected and protected, no decision is to be made without hearing from a person who will be 
potentially affected by the decision and that reasons must be made in writing to the person 
who is affected by a decision. Procedural fairness demands that where the statute places the 
decision-making power in one person’s hands, then that person must make the decision and 
conduct any hearing that may be necessary otherwise the decision will be null and void.  
On procedural fairness and rule making, it is noted that there is limited public participation in 
rule making and hence people who are likely to be affected by revenue decisions are not 
consulted or informed of the decisions. Considering the mandatory nature of tax payment and 
the Malawi Revenue Policy that advocates fairness and voluntary compliance by the general 
citizenry, there is a need to engage the tax payers before making revenue laws, ensure that 
their economic and financial circumstances are taken into account before legislating on the 
amount of tax payable. Further, there is total exclusion of the general public with regard to 
processes that are internally driven due to assumed technical incompetency in tax matters by 
ordinary citizens. The exclusion affects public interest and legitimate expectations. An in-
depth discussion of procedural fairness in rule-making is further discussed under public 
participation. 
With regard to exercise of powers by decision makers, Section 17(3) and (7) of the MRA Act 
has the power to delegate his function to a revenue commissioner or any officer. Further, 
                                                          
43 Civil Cause No. 34 of 1998 
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Revenue Commissioners and Controllers are mandated by law to delegate certain functions to 
other officers. 44It is noted that the rule- making function by technical departments within 
MRA is performed by officials in a delegated capacity. In that regard then decisions on rule-
making are performed by officials who are mandated by law and hence there is no abdication 
of authority in revenue law making by the Commissioner General.  
 
4. 2.3 Reasonableness in Rule -Making 
The concept of unreasonableness is two-fold: it includes making a decision in bad faith and 
taking into account irrelevant considerations when making decisions.45 In The State –v- 
Council for the University of Malawi, ex parte, Zaibula46 in which he said: 
“Where exercise of power by a statutory body is on irrelevant or extraneous grounds 
or in bad faith, it is susceptible to judicial review.” 
Indeed, Lord Greene considered at length what amounts to “unreasonable”  exercise of 
discretion in the Wednesbury case, supra, in the following way: 
“It is true that discretion must be excised reasonably. What does that mean? Lawyers 
familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exrcise of statutory 
discretions often used the word ‘unreasonableness’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It 
is usually used as a general discretion of the things that must not be done. For 
instance, a person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly 
in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. 
He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to 
consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said, and is often said, to be 
acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, you may have something so absurd that no sensible 
person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority (or a 
corporation). Warrington L.J. gave example of a red-haired teacher, dismissed 
because she had red hair (Short –v- Poole Corp. (1926) Ch. 66). That is 
unreasonable in one sense. In the other sense, it is taking into consideration 
                                                          
44 Section 7 of the Customs and Excise Act 
45 Associated Provincial Picture House Limited v Wednesbury Corporation  (1947) 2ALLER  680 
46 Civil Cause No. 34 of 1997, High Court, Principal Registry 
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extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being 
done in bad faith, and in fact all these things run in one another.”47  
The concept of unreasonableness therefore requires that an Agency must not act in bad faith 
or take into account irrelevant factors when making revenue laws/rules. The adherence to 
reasonableness ensures that there is no arbitrariness in the law/rule making processes and 
ultimately the promotion of the rule of law which is one of the elements of good governance. 
The research found that there are various factors that are taken into account in the making of 
revenue laws and rules. With regard to the MRA, the specific needs of sector, e.g. Bankers 
Association, Minibus Association, Buses Association and the telecommunication or 
extractive industries, will be considered before deciding on the new tax laws.  Further, 
research is done within MRA that considers the political, social and economic impact of a 
proposed reduction or increase in payable tax or its impact on the tax net. In terms of 
statutory laws, the Ministry of Finance, Revenue Department, designs tax policies. The tax 
policies direct the process of revenue law making. The Ministry of Finance also conducts 
research on proposed laws before proposing changes or amendments to tax laws. The analysis 
evidences that the practice of taking into account relevant consideration before making a 
decision is pivotal as it promotes the rule of law and ultimately furthers good governance. 
However, instances of political interference in rule making were evident. There are instances 
where a decision has been made to remove import duty on a particular tax base basing on 
political influences. Examples were given of the decision to remove import duty on buses 
which was purely based on the interest of certain traders and not the impact on revenue 
collection. It was noted that political influences are in certain instances taken into account 
when making a decision on the tax base. Such political interference and influences results in 
irrelevant considerations being taken into account on revenue law making and do not further 
good governance. 
4. 2 Rule-Application 
MRA is responsible for the assessment, collection and receipt of specified revenue48 and 
enforcement of tax laws on behalf of the State.49 MRA is also responsible for the 
                                                          
47 [1947] 2 All ER 680, at 683 
48 Revenue includes taxes, duties, fees and fines imposed or collected under the written laws- see section 2 of 
the Malawi Revenue Authority Act. 
49 Section 4(1) of the MRA Act. 
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administration and enforcement of tax laws and the promotion of voluntary tax compliance. 50 
MRA has also been given powers under the law to take such other measures as the Authority 
deems necessary or desirable for the achievement of the purposes or provisions of the MRA 
Act. In the application of tax rules, the Agency is to have regard to Section 13 (m) of the 
Republic of Malawi Constitution which requires the state to promote among others humane 
application and enforcement of laws.  
Further, Section 13(o) of the Constitution encourages the adoption of measures which will 
guarantee accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity and which by 
virtue of their effectiveness and visibility will strengthen confidence in public institutions.  
Specifically, Section 171 of the Constitution provides that no tax, rate, duty or levy shall be 
raised, levied or imposed for the purposes of the government or any local government 
otherwise than by the authority of the law. The legal framework governing the functions of 
MRA includes the Republic of Malawi Constitution of 1994, the Taxation Act51, the Customs 
and Excise Act52 and the Value Added Tax Act.53 The statutes on revenue then provide the 
framework within which tax is collected and the specific calculations of various taxes. There 
are also regulations that have been made under the various revenue statutes that ensure 
effective administration of taxes. The Commissioner General has vast discretionary powers in 
the administration of tax matters.54 
 
4. 2.1 Legality in Rule Implementation 
There are various actors that are involved in the enforcement and implementation of revenue 
laws and rules. With regard to Customs and Excise Duty, the Border Station Officers and 
Inland Revenue officers are responsible for implementing the Customs and Excise Act. The 
Commissioner of Customs is the overseer and works closely with the operations and 
enforcement departments. The Commissioner for Domestic Taxes handles Income Tax and 
Value Added Tax. The Tax Investigation Unit has police powers of arrest, search or seizure 
of goods and is a key play in tax enforcement. It is duly noted that the actors are empowered 
                                                          
50 Section 4(2) of the MRA Act. 
51 Cap 41:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
52 Cap 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
53 Cap 42:02 of the Laws of Malawi 
54 Some of the discretionary powers of the Commissioner General include the power to determine taxable 
income from which Export allowance is deducted, determination of allowable deductions against assessable 
income arising from the sale of timber and extension of time to pay taxes and remission of penalties. 
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by law to implement revenue laws as they perform functions on behalf of the Commissioner 
General. 
The research findings are also that there are Clearing Agents that are stationed at border 
Station Offices, Inland Revenue offices and Airports that engage directly with the general 
citizenry in the process of clearing goods and revenue payment. Section 128 of the Customs 
and Excise Act allows the Controller to, on application, license persons as customs agents for 
the purpose of transacting business with the Department on behalf of other persons. The 
Controller has granted several licenses to clearing houses. The Clearing Agents have access 
to the online system of the Malawi Revenue Authority and also give updates to the citizenry 
on whether goods have been cleared or not. It was observed that the clearing agents act as a 
bridge between the Agency and the general citizenry in most cases. However, the respondents  
found at the Border Station, Inland Revenue offices and airport were not aware of the link 
between MRA and the clearing institutions. It is also generally difficult to identify the 
licensed agents as they also appoint other personnel to find customers for them and hence the 
general citizenry is prone to abuse. The clearing agents also do not assist the citizenry 
effectively as their knowledge is limited to the filling of custom forms and are mostly not 
conversant with customs and excise laws generally. Further, it was also observed that where a 
person makes the initiative of clearing goods on their own, there are referred to an agent and 
not allowed to engage direct with the Station Officers. Further, there is a lot of malpractice 
that results between the clearing agents and the station officers resulting from the close and 
daily interactions between the clearing houses and MRA officers. Whilst the legal basis for 
appointing of clearing agents is clear and that they assist MRA in their conduct of their 
responsibilities, their conduct and interaction with the citizenry does not further democratic 
governance. 
Finally, it is noted that the powers of implementation under the law are given to the 
Commissioner General and he may delegate his functions to a Revenue Commissioner or any 
officer. In that regard, the implementation officers discharge their functions in a delegated 
capacity. The legality of further delegation to outside institutions such as clearing house 
agents and other institutions through licensing and appointment raises governance problems. 
The clearing agents are the first point of contact at the border stations and a lot of 
malpractices occur as they do not operate under the direct supervision of the Station 
Managers at the border office.  
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With regard to the processes and mechanisms, the MRA implements all taxation statutes in 
Malawi, namely, the Taxation Act, Customs and Excise Act and Value Added Tax Act. It is 
noted that the implementing officials find the rules to be very complex and a lot of 
flexibilities and compromises are adopted to ensure that there is effective implementation. It 
was reported by respondents that the Customs and Excise division at the Headquarters of 
MRA simplify the laws into simple language for internal use by making procedures and 
guidelines for its officers to follow. The process involves the interpretation of provisions in 
the various statutes for ease of application and enforcement by MRA officers.  It was not 
clear how the new simplified rules are the same with the original rules in the revenue laws. 
However, the respondents were quick to say that they ensure that the guidelines are within the 
law and not go outside what the laws stipulates.  
 
It was also reported that since the simplified rules are for internal use, they do not involve 
outside players to comment or assist in the interpretation of the law. It was also reported that 
if there is a change in procedure; they usually inform various stakeholders who may be 
affected by the change. An example was given where MRA had to change its procedure in 
clearing of goods using an Inland Examination Centre. Upon the introduction of this centre, 
MRA is said to have engaged transporters and clearing agents with the view of informing 
them about the change in procedure. The change was to affect goods that are cleared inland 
other than at the border posts. Notices and circulars informing the public of the changes are 
also issued. The Commissioner General is the one who has the final authority of what is to be 
contained in the procedures within MRA. 
 
In terms of legality, the implementation of the rules and all processes and mechanisms ought 
to be done in accordance with the law.  The law provides that customs and Excise 
assessments are to be done in accordance with the valuation, classification, rules of origin and 
standard assessment procedures provided by the World Customs Office (WCO) and the 
Customs and Excise Act. However, in practice the rules are said to be complex and give 
problems enforcing officers such as inland and border post officials. It is also problematic to 
make distinctions between certain classification of goods and this raises problems between 
the customs officers, clearing agents and clients. Whilst most of the customs officials were 
able to identify with the Customs and Excise Act and the Rules of the WCO, there were not 
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able to understand the technical rules that are contained in the laws. As such, in their day to 
day implementation of the rules, they rely on the simplified guidelines and forms that are 
made by the Customs Technical Department at the MRA- Head Office. The officers were not 
able to state whether the simplified rules are in tandem with the rules under statute. The 
situation results in actual bias in rule implementation. 
The research then concludes that the process and mechanism followed rule implementation 
largely do follow the law and are therefore lawful. However, in instances where rule 
interpretation does not accord with the revenue laws and where implementation is hampered 
by the complexity of tax rules, there is illegality in the conduct of affairs and hence bad 
governance. 
 
4. 2.2 Procedural Fairness in Rule Implementation 
The implementing officers work with members of the general public on a day to day basis. 
As such, decisions must be made by legally appointed personnel, reasons must be given in 
writing where legitimate expectation will be affected by a decision and the officers must 
adopt procedural fairness in the discharge of their functions.  
The research findings were that most decisions that are made by the Agency are done by 
legally appointed actors save for instances where there is abdication of authority through 
delegation to other Agents. The implementing officers do not engage in dialogue with clients 
and members of the general public in the discharge of their responsibilities both at the border 
and inland stations. That dialogue would have enabled the officer to explain the tax 
computation to a client and enable the client to make a voluntary declaration of documents or 
goods that are a subject of tax assessment.  
The research interrogated the processes and mechanisms followed in the implementation of 
the Electronic Fiscal Device (EFD) which raised controversies amongst the general populace 
in Malawi. The EFD is an advanced version of an electronic cash register, records all sales 
transactions and provides evidence of such transaction in a technically easy and undisputed 
way. It is used in the collection VAT and customers are encouraged to demand a fiscal 
receipt for purchases made. The EFD raised problems in terms of implementation. The focus 
of the study was on how decisions were made with regard to the device and what procedures 
were adopted in the implementation of the EFD. 
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The research findings are that there are a number of processes that were involved by MRA 
and most of the initiatives were internally driven within the Agency. A decision was made by 
a project implementing team from MRA that it was necessary to utilise the EFD in collection 
of VAT after internal studies were made of the need to adopt the devise. It was further 
reported that usually when MRA wants to embark on new measures or policies they do 
research in and outside the country to assess best practices, and that research results into 
concept notes which are discussed within MRA and sometimes if there is a need the Minister 
of Finance is involved. After that the project or measure gets implemented through various 
phases. That this was what happened with the introduction of the EFD. 
The MRA continually referred to EFD as just a ‘method’ of collecting tax and not an 
introduction of new tax. The procedure of coming up with EFD was said to be the procedure 
which is used in coming up with any other policy in MRA. The Policy Planning Division 
specifically highlighted that the EFD was a new device that was going to assist the Revenue 
Agency in efficient collection of taxes. The Corporate Affairs Department raised public 
awareness on the new measure through stakeholder meetings with the business community, 
issued leaflets and brochures and conducted radio programmes on TV to raise public 
awareness.  
During implementation, a number of business communities did not comply with the 
requirement that they use the EFD. The reasons for non compliance related to the lack of 
consultation before introducing the devise and the traders disputed the process of identifying 
the suppliers of the devise. MRA, however, stated the concerned traders were not tax 
compliant and resisted the implementation as it would lead to them paying more tax. The 
view of MRA is that since EFD is a means of collecting taxes its inception was no concern 
for outside players and there was no need for their involvement in coming up with the tool. 
The Agency, however, engaged the business community after it faced resistance but the 
internal procedures were not effective to resolve the matter which matter was then filed in 
Court.  
The analysis evidences that the members of the general public were not consulted in the 
initial conceptualisation of the EFD i.e. when the agency was making a rule to introduce the 
device. Consultations were only done before implementing the said devise. It is also observed 
that when problems arose during the implementation stage, the internal mechanisms were not 
effective as a strong stance was taken by MRA that the EFD was not a new tax that would 
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require extensive public participation and that closed the room for any meaningful 
engagement to be done with the concerned traders. It is also observed that procedural fairness 
is mostly considered with regard adjudication and not the day to day decisions that are made 
during implementation. It was further noted that MRA does not consult where a rule is made 
relating to methods of tax collection and this result in problems during implementation. It is 
recommended that MRA should have engaged in more meaningful consultations with the 
affected business groups to ultimately promote good governance. 
4. 2.3 Reasonableness in Rule Implementation 
Reasonableness mandates that the officers do take into account relevant matters when making 
a decision and that bad faith must be avoided in decision making.55 The implementing 
officers make decisions with regard to tax assessment on a day to day basis. It is important 
that they embrace the concept of reasonableness, to avoid making decisions that are arbitrary 
and that impinge on the rule of law, in order to further good governance. 
The research findings are that the Station Officers, Inland Revenue Officers, Airport Officers, 
and those based at the Malawi Revenue Authority are guided by the revenue laws in making 
decisions on payable tax and in the day to day implementation of tax laws. However, there 
are several factors that constrain decision making. In instances where a person has political 
connections or is in fact a politician,56 they interfere with decision making and influence the 
decision maker to the extent that they pass with goods without paying duty at the Border 
Stations or not pay income tax on their businesses. The high ranking officials reported that 
the problem is faced by both inland and border posts offices and that they receive calls from 
the Head Offices commanding that goods or vehicles be left to pass without paying customs 
duty. A specific example was given of a well known transport company whose vehicles were 
impounded by MRA because they had information that there was conduct of tax evasion. The 
Tax Investigative Unit conducted research and there was evidence to that effect. The high 
ranking official was given instructions by a high ranking Executing Officer to release the 
vehicles without any further process taking place.  
Further, the Commissioner General has been given wide discretion to make decisions on 
behalf of the Agency.  It was reported that there are several instances where the 
Commissioner General has made final decision on the amount of payable taxes after 
considering a request made by a citizen through his office. The decisions, either to reduce or 
                                                          
55 Supra Note 44 
56 Such as a Member of Parliament, a Minister or  a high ranking executive officer 
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confirm payable tax, have been made without any explanation and no further inquiries are 
made since the powers have been vested in his office to make decisions on behalf of the 
Agency. 
The Station and Inland Revenue Officers further stated other outside factors that constrain 
their decision making relating to Customs Agents and the general citizenry. Agents and 
clients produce fake invoices57 so that pay less duty on the goods or items they want to clear 
at the officers.  Inquiries are sometimes made through the Data Processing Unit to verify the 
authenticity of the invoice but where there is connivance between the parties, the fake invoice 
is used in processing goods. Some clients do not produce invoices and others do undervalue 
goods that make it difficult to assess their goods. The officers face challenges in 
implementing the rules and have to find ways of assessing payable duty without invoices. 
There is further diversion of goods at the border posts and this involves clients hiring 
motorist to by-pass the border post.58 The problem is more common amongst small and 
medium business traders and not large corporations. The Tax Investigation Unit specifically 
raised the problems of tax planners and tax evaders who are not 100% tax compliant. The 
investigations officer stated that they have exceptional powers and do deal with such 
categories with strict penalties and enforcement of the law. 59  
The analysis evidences that there are instances of arbitrariness in decision making by the 
Commissioner General and this involves the lack of judicious exercise of discretion. Such 
practices do not further democratic governance as other categories of tax payers are made to 
be above the law. It is important that the Commissioner General, though having been given 
wide discretion, to have regard to the revenue laws before making a decision on reduction or 
increase on payable tax. Further, the increase in executive and political interference in 
decision making does not further good governance as it promotes non payment of tax and 
consequently affects the delivery of public services and also oppresses the poor. With regard 
to the Station and Inland Revenue Officers, they must take into only relevant factors when 
making a decision. The continued use of fake invoices in the assessment of payable import 
duty does not further good governance. It is important in this regard that MRA strongly 
supervises the conduct of Clearing House as the production of fake invoices is done on 
                                                          
57 this involves reproducing an invoice and stated a lower purchase price for the goods 
58 other roots such as rivers  
59 The current practice of using extensive police powers by MRA mirror the punitive sanctions that were met out 
on the general citizenry in the Colonial times in Malawi. 
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premises that are near their border and Inland Revenue offices. The powers of search and 
seizure have already been given to officers under the Customs and Excise Act.60 
 
4. 3 Adjudication of Disputes 
Adjudication is the legal process by which an arbiter hears and reviews evidence given by 
witnesses and legal arguments advanced by the parties to come to a decision which 
determines the rights and obligations of the parties.61  Principles of administrative law are to 
be applied in the process of adjudication so as to promote fairness, transparency and 
accountability by decision makers. The study considered the legality of the actors and 
processes involved in hearing disputes by the MRA, whether the hearings embody procedural 
fairness and whether the decisions made embrace the concept of reasonableness.  
 
4. 3.1 Legality in Adjudication 
The revenue laws provide for specific adjudicating personnel and bodies that handle 
complaints relating to assessment of value added tax, income tax or import or export duty. 
The law further mandates specific officers to hear matters on appeal and resolve complaints 
within the Agency. The personnel and bodies under the Taxation Act62 include: the 
Commissioner of Taxes63, Administrative Officer,64 Special Arbitrator, 65 Traditional Appeal 
Court and the High Court. Under the Customs and Excise Act, an appeal against payable duty 
is made to the Special Referee who is appointed by the Minister of Finance. The duty must be 
paid before an appeal is made in writing and a final appeal lies with the Resident Magistrate 
Court.66 The Commissioner General and Resident Magistrate have the powers to hear 
disputes under the Value Added Tax Act.67 
The research findings are that in practice, with regard to Customs and Excise Duty, the 
Border and Inland Revenue ports set up Station Committees comprising of four people that 
handle complaints. The committees comprises of the Station Manager or Deputy Station 
                                                          
60 Section 13 of the Customs and Excise Act 
61  
62 Cap 41:01 of the Laws of Malawi, sections 97, 98, 100. 
63 Section 97 of the Taxation Act 
64 Section 100 of the Taxation Act 
65 Section 98 of the Taxation Act 
66 Cap 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi, sections 120 and 152 
67 Cap 42:02 of the Laws of Malawi, section 43 and 44 
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Manager, a Supervisor, Clerk and the officer whose decision is being challenged. The matter 
is only referred to the Committee when the Revenue Officer who made the decision and the 
complainants (taxpayer and clearing agents) cannot resolve the dispute. There are no gender 
considerations in the setting up of the Committee. If the complainant is not satisfied with the 
decision, they are given a chance to appeal to the MRA Headquarters. An Appeals 
Committee comprising of Heads from the various sections is constituted as cases arise. The 
Committee only handles formal complaints and a bulk of the informal complaints are handled 
by other officers. The Committee is constituted by the Commissioner General and once a 
decision is made, it is referred to the Commissioner General for endorsement. The 
Commissioner can make a decision that is contrary to the recommendation by the Committee. 
The complainants may appeal to the court when not satisfied with the decision on appeal. The 
Committees that are set up at the MRA Headquarters also hear complaints on income and 
value added tax. 
The analysis evidences that there are multiple actors and a multiplicity of adjudicating bodies 
under revenue laws. Most of the bodies created by law have not been constituted and those 
that are operational are not accessible to members of the general public.68 Further, the bodies 
are ad hoc and operate only when there is dispute before them. The responsible officers such 
as the Commissioner or Administrative officers do not handle disputes on appeal as they 
delegate the functions to appointed personnel who handle appeals when a complaint under 
Taxation Act or Value Added Act is received. The Committees will comprise of a member 
from each division within MRA. There are no guidelines that stipulate the competence, 
gender balance, qualification or mandate of the Committees. It may be argued that the 
formulation of the committee is valid as the Commissioner has powers under section 4 of the 
Taxation Act to delegate some of his functions.  However, there is over abdication of 
authority as all cases are held by the Committee on first instance. It is also noted that the 
Commissioner sits on appeals when an appeal is made against the decision of the Committee 
which makes a decisions on his behalf hence sitting as a judge in his own cause.  
In terms of legality, it is noted that the Committees that are formulated in Inland and Border 
posts do not have a legal mandate to handle disputes under Customs and Excise Act as the 
powers lie with the Controller of Customs and Excise. Further, the composition has no legal 
basis as the law requires that a Special Referee should hear the complaints relating to customs 
                                                          




and excise duty after a decision is made by the Controller of Customs and Excise. The 
Customs and Excise Act provides that the Special Referee, and not the Commissioner 
General or his delegate, should hear matters on appeal under the Customs and Excise Act. 
Further, the Traditional Appeal Court is not in existence. Although the law provides for 
different tribunals to handle matters under the various statutes, the Committees that are 
formulated within the agencies handle all complaints. It was stated by the Legal Affairs 
department that the Committee performs delegated functions as allowed under the law. 
 
4. 3.2 Procedural Fairness in Adjudication 
The right to procedural fairness69 embodies the cardinal rules of natural justice namely the 
right to be heard and the rule against bias. The right to be heard entails that a complainant 
must be given an opportunity to prepare for the case made against them, dispute the evidence, 
to be accorded an oral hearing and be given reasons in writing before a decision is made. The 
requirement of sufficient notice was stated in the case of R –v- Thames Magistrates, ex 
parte Polemis,70 where the Applicant was served with summons at 10.30am, itself returnable 
to the Magistrate’s court at 2.00pm the same day. It was held that the notice was insufficient. 
Accordingly, Widgery CJ held that an order of certiorari would be granted quashing the 
conviction of the magistrate court because it was a basic and elementary requirement of the 
rules of natural justice that a party to proceedings should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
present his case and that included a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case before being 
called upon to present it. 
 In Chakhaza –v- Portland Cement Company,71 Justice Potani cited with approval the 
following statement by Lord Denning in Kanda –v- Government of Malaya:72 
“If the right to be heard is to be real which is worth anything, it must carry with it a 
right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know 
what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him and 
then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict it.”  
Thus, in Wiseman –v- Borneman,73  Lord Morris had this to say: 
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“I feel bound to express my prima facie dislike of a situation in which the tribunal has 
before it a document (which contains both facts and arguments) which is calculated to 
influence the tribunal but which has not been seen by a party who will be affected by 
the tribunal’s determination.” 
The requirement of the law is not only that the charges must be known but that they should be 
set down with sufficient particularities to allow the accused properly prepare their defence. In 
Lameck Moyo –v- National Bank of Malawi,74 the court stated: 
“As for the procedural fairness, it is important that the particulars of the charge should 
be clearly specified….Failure to do this would be unfair…and would lead to 
miscarriage of procedural justice.”  
When, tax issues arise, MRA should be giving the taxpayer the right to challenge the 
evidence offered against him. This means that the taxpayer must be given the liberty of cross-
examining or confronting the accuser. Kanda –v- Government of Malaya, supra, makes it 
very clear that a man is supposed to be afforded a fair opportunity to correct or contradict 
evidence against him. In Lameck Moyo –v- National Bank of Malawi, supra, the court 
properly stated the principle in the following terms: 
“Moreover, it is trite law that an employee need be given a chance to confront 
whoever is accusing him of any misconduct. In the present case, the applicant was not 
given that chance, the respondent heard the accuser in the absence of the applicant 
and he only had a chance to question the accuser in this court.”  
Similarly, in Khoswe –v- National Bank of Malawi,75 the court said: 
“It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that where a duty to act fairly demands 
an oral hearing, the right to cross-examine witnesses existed.” 
On the other hand, the rule against bias demands that a person must not be judge in their own 
cause.76 
The research findings are that revenue laws provide for processes and mechanism that are 
followed in the adjudication of disputes. The Taxation Act provides two appellate procedures. 
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The first appellate procedure under section 97 of the Taxation Act allows a tax payer to 
appeal to the Commissioner of Taxes if aggrieved by any assessment made upon him or any 
decision by the Commissioner of Taxes in relation to an assessment. If the tax payer is not 
satisfied with the decision of the Commissioner of Taxes, they may appeal to a Special 
Arbitrator.77 Section 98 of the Taxation Act provides that the Special Arbitrator may appoint 
assessors to assist during the hearing and the proceedings are conducted in private. The 
second appellate procedure is stated under section 100 of the Taxation Act which provides 
that a tax payer may appeal to an Administrative Officer who has made a decision. If not 
satisfied, an appeal may be lodged with the Traditional Appeal Court that is present in the 
district concerned. The Complainant must pay duty before appealing.78 
The rules of procedure are provided under the 8th Schedule to the Taxation Act.  Procedures 
for Courts are exhaustive. However, the procedures for the Commissioner and Administrative 
officer have not been clearly stated. Where an appeal is heard before the Commissioner or an 
Administrative Officer, a statement in writing must be written by the complainant within 30 
days after decision is made, the Commissioner or an Administrative Officer may require the 
personal attendance of the complainant and that they may adopt their own rules of 
procedures. Where proceedings are held before a Special Arbitrator who is currently the 
Chief Resident Magistrate, the complainant is required to submit a written notice of intention 
to appeal to the Commissioner within 21 days after his decision, a written statement 
containing grounds of appeal and arguments in law to be relied on.79 The Commissioner is 
mandated to serve his reply and finally the final determination of the Special Arbitrator is 
made. All proceedings are held in English and not any of the local languages. If a 
complainant is not satisfied with the final decision then they may appeal to the High Court 
only on points of law within 21 days.80 The normal rules of procedure of the court during 
appeals apply. 
In respect to the Customs and Excise Act which governs the matters of customs and excise 
duties, section 120 permits the Minister of Finance to appoint a Special Referee who hears 
appeals against a decision of the Controller of Customs and Excise.  The complaint may 
appeal to the Resident Magistrate if not satisfied by the decision of the Special Referee. The 
rules of procedure are also stated under the Act that a complainant must pay duty before 
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appealing and must state the grounds of appeal in writing within 3 months from the date of 
the decision.81 The Special Referee must publish in the Gazette the date of the hearing of the 
appeal. Members of the public who have legitimate trade interest or a legal practitioner may 
be heard if they file the notice of intent to appear and where proceedings relate to 
classification of goods. The procedure on appeal shall be determined by the Special Referee. 
If not satisfied the applicant may apply to the Resident Magistrate Court which hears the 
complaint according to laid down procedures. 
In respect to the Value Added Tax Act, section 43 allows a tax payer to appeal to the 
Commissioner General within 30 days after a decision is made by the tax officer. The 
complaint must be made in writing and supported by documents.82 If not satisfied, the 
complainant may appeal to the Resident Magistrate Court but only after payment of the 
amount of tax charged to MRA. 
It was evidenced by the research that the law fairy incorporates principles of procedural 
fairness to an extent however in practice problems arise. The right to be heard has not been 
fully protected in the hearing of disputes. The procedure adopted at the Inland and Border 
Station offices is that a complainant or an agent will fill in details on the Valuation Appeals 
Questionnaire83. A brief description of the appeal is made with supporting letters, invoices, 
receipts, airway bills or bill of lading. When the Committee is sitting the written complaint is 
read out and discussed by the Committee without adopting any specific procedures. The 
revenue officer who made the decision is present and is allowed to dispute and clarify matters 
but is not involved in decision making. The customer or the agent are not present at the 
hearing and may only be called in rare circumstances when the documents are not sufficient. 
Thus, the complainant is not accorded the right to be orally heard whilst the revenue officer, 
whose decision is disputed, is given that right. The complainants are not present to dispute 
the evidence given against them and their participation is dependent on the discretion of the 
tribunal hearing the disputes.  
Further, the rule against bias requires that the hearing be made by an impartial and 
independent tribunal. Sections 97 and 100 of the Taxation Act allow the taxpayer to appeal to 
the Commissioner or Administrative Office when aggrieved by their decision. In essence ,the 
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Commissioner and Administrative officer will sit on the appeal case and yet the decision 
being dispute were made by them. In practice, the Commissioner of Taxes constitutes an 
Appeals Committee composed members from different departments to sit on Appeals.  The 
appeal, however, is still against a decision that was made by him and the Commissioner is 
present during hearings. This is a blatant violation of the rule against bias which states that 
you cannot be judge in your own cause. The rule against bias is further violated in the 
proceedings as interested parties sit as adjudicators during appeals.  
It is further noted that these is no public participation in tax adjudication and the tax laws 
clearly excludes members of the general public from the hearings except in cases where an 
appeal is made on classification of goods and the member of the public has a legitimate trade 
interest in that. The decisions that are made are also not made public and where a publication 
is made, the particulars of the tax payer are not disclosed. Section 98 (4) of the taxation Act 
clearly provides that proceedings before a Special Arbitrator shall not be public and a Special 
Arbitrator shall exclude or require withdrawing from the place of hearing all or any persons 
whose attendance is not considered by him to be necessary, and shall take appropriate 
measures to preserve the anonymity of the taxpayer. The justifications for such exclusion are 
to protect the right to privacy of the tax payer and to abide by the undertaking to keep matters 
confidential.  However, there is a need to interrogate such justification in the light of the need 
for transparency and accountability in all decision making processes. A balance must be 
made that allows public participation by making the records public and keeping the details of 
the tax payer confidential.  
The revenue laws are also restrictive as they only allow the individual tax payer to appeal to 
the High Court only on points of law and not facts. Section 101 of the Taxation Act provides 
that either party to proceedings before a Special Arbitrator under section 98 or a Traditional 
Appeal Court under section 100 may appeal in the prescribed manner to the High Court on a 
point of law. The High Court is also restricted to make findings only on points of law or 
procedure and not make an inquiry on the facts. A comparison with other laws, such as 
Section 346(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence which provides that an appeal may be 
upon a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law, evidences that there is an undue restriction 
in revenue appeals. It is further argued most of the disputes that are brought under revenue 




The analysis also notes several other factors that impede on procedural fairness in the 
adjudication process. It is noted that the Commissioner of Taxes, Special Referee and 
Administrative Officer have been given the discretion to adopt their own rules of procedure 
in the handling of disputes. It was very difficult to determine the extent to which the 
discretion has been used in practice as the records of proceedings are confidential and not 
easily accessible. A tax payer is further obliged to pay the amount of tax before filing a notice 
of appeal under the various mechanisms. The requirements affects the right to appeal of the 
tax payer as the mechanisms are not accessible where one fails to pay the amount. 
4. 3.3 Reasonableness in Adjudication 
With regard to matters that are taken into consideration before a decision is made, it was 
noted that decision that are made by MRA are not made public and proceedings are heard in 
camera. The officials stated that they base their decisions on revenue laws and not any other 
outside factors. It is argued that the judicial oversight that is available by way of appeal 
ensures that there is correct application of law. 
4. 3.4 Contextual issues  
The dispute adjudicating bodies have not performed to the satisfaction of the complainants. In 
cases held at the border posts, it has taken a lot of time to receive the decision of the 
Controller on Appeal. Most of the customers would proceed to pay duty and not follow up on 
the appeal as they cannot leave their goods at the border posts because of prolonged appeals 
processes. The Malawi Revenue rated the entire adjudicating process fair and attributed the 
delays to lack of knowledge on the part of the tax payers and agents. 
 
4. 4 Nature and forms of public participation in rule making, 
implementation and adjudication processes 
 
4. 4.1 Administrative Autonomy and  Public Participation in Decision- Making  
Administrative autonomy was historically present in the administration of tax. It was 
generally thought that the administrators of revenue have wide discretionally powers to make 
decision without engaging with the general public. Participation ought to be limited to law-
making by the legislature and that administrative rule-making is essentially the 
implementation of policy in which participation is not the norm since this is the exclusive 
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purview of the executive branch.84 Related to this is the argument that administrative 
rulemaking is a technical exercise that is best undertaken by technocrats with minimal 
interference by the politics that come with public participation.85 However, it has been argued 
that such exceptionalism is unwarranted considering the impact of revenue decisions on the 
general public.86 The general citizenry should be given an opportunity to participate in tax 
administration as attain the bargaining power against the State through paying taxes.87 It has 
also been noted instead of putting confidence in an expert bureaucrat to accomplish public 
purposes; there should be more accountability, participation and transparency in 
administrative bodies.88 Public participation is hence understood as a process whereby the 
general citizenry is given an opportunity to meaningfully contribute and engage with the 
political or administrative decision making processes.   
Public participation is important for a number of reasons. It potentially improves the quality 
of decision-making due to the broadened perspectives as well as improved public compliance 
with such decisions.89 Public participation improves the quality of government decision-
making through increased accountability, “educating public officials about the local effects of 
their decisions” and bringing a wide range of stakeholder perspectives into a particular 
issue.90 Public participation also furthers the legitimacy of decisions made, increases a sense 
of ownership and legitimacy of decisions made and enhances the chances of compliance.91 
Public participation is “most successful at achieving social acceptance and adherence to.... 
regulations.....”92 Considering the relevance of public participation, there is a need to balance 
between public participation and administrative or technocratic autonomy. The challenge for 
any administrative law regime is to formulate and ensure the enforcement of norms that strike 
a balance between optimal participation against administrative autonomy that ultimately 
promotes governance without negating administrative efficiency and effectiveness 
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It is noted that public participation in revenue rule making has been limited to a greater extent 
and where consultations are done they are mostly with members of the organised community 
such as professions bodies. MRA and the Minister of Finance mostly propose revenue laws 
and rules by using the technocrats within their departments. Whilst the law/rule-making 
power and discretion is given to MRA and the Ministry of Finance, it is important that they 
meaningfully engage with the general populace so that their lived experiences are taken into 
account in revenue laws and this will increase the level of compliance.  Further, it is also 
noted that public participation will further openness, transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy in revenue operations. 
4. 4.2 Direct and Indirect Public Participation 
There are generally two forms of public participation in rulemaking, implementation and 
adjudication processes. Public participation is either direct or indirect. Direct participation 
means a fulfilment of one’s legal rights and duties as specified in the Constitution, or 
alternatively, active involvement in substantive issues of government and community93.  
Whilst in indirect participation, individual members of the public, express their opinions 
through their representatives, agents or other intermediaries.94 The right to directly and 
indirectly participate in political and public life is important in empowering individuals and 
groups, and is one of the core elements of human rights-based approaches aimed at 
eliminating marginalization and discrimination. Participation rights are inextricably linked to 
other human rights such as the rights to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of 
expression and opinion and the rights to education and to information.95 
In practice it was found that most public contributions in revenue issues do not come from the 
general citizenry but from associations and professional bodies such as the accounting 
profession. That these associations are the ones who mostly discover areas that need 
refinement or review in revenue issues. The proposals by associations are made in writing 
and are addressed to the Commissioner General or the Minister of Finance. The proposals are 
then forwarded to policy planning of MRA which also seek inputs on such proposals from 
various departments within the agency to assess the implications of the proposals on 
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operations of their departments. And if they are good proposals they get implemented. It is 
thus evident that public participation in revenue matters is mainly indirect as opposed to 
direct participation. However, most of the professional bodies do represent the interest of 
their members and not the interest of the wider populace. Further, there are no general 
consultations with the public or ordinary citizen before they make their proposals to the 
revenue authorities. 
On the other hand, it is also observed that there is lack of robust demand for good governance 
from the general citizenry. The general citizenry has deferred the demand for justice to NGO 
such as MEJN and other professional bodies. Unlike in the colonial times where the citizens 
did demand tax justice by protesting, the current scenario evidences that citizens do not 
actively engage with institutions due to lack of effective mechanisms for public engagement. 
 
4. 4.3 Processes of Public Participation in Revenue Decisions 
 
Governments and agencies employ a number of mechanisms to engage and support citizen 
participation. Participatory procedures include; referenda, parliamentary inquiries, surveys, 
roundtable conferences, workshops, local meetings and consensus conferences.96 The type of 
decision to be made informs the appropriate type of procedure to be had.97Whatever form 
public participation takes, a relevant consideration should always be whether the participation 
will be meaningful and whether it is likely to have an impact on the policy, decision or 
legislation finally adopted.98 Arnstein,99 notes that there is a critical difference between going 
through an empty ritual of participation and having the real power to affect the outcome of 
the process. She identifies the eight important rungs on her ‘ladder’ of citizen participation. 
Firstly, there is what she refers to as; therapy and manipulation (non-participation), that its 
real objective is not to enable people to participate but to enable power holders to ‘educate’ or 
‘cure’ the participants. She states that merely following a series of sequential, mechanical 
steps intended to ‘win over’ or ‘educate’ citizens on a major policy proposal risks failing to 
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engage them and risks losing an opportunity for citizens to form a relationship with the 
issue.100 
Placation, consultation and informing (degree of tokenism) are another level of citizen 
participation that Arnstein identifies. She notes that this step allows the have- nots to hear and 
have a voice. She states that, informing can be the most important legitimate first step for 
citizen participation. However, it is often based on a one way flow of information from 
officials to citizens with no channels for feedback and no power for negotiation, under these 
circumstances people have no power to influence the program designed for their benefit. She 
notes that the most frequent tools used for such one way communications are pamphlets, 
news media and response to inquiries. Meetings can also be turned into vehicles for one way 
communication where superficial information is provided, questions are discouraged and 
irrelevant answers given. The most frequent means of consulting people are attitude surveys, 
neighbourhood meetings, and public hearings. When participation is restricted to this level, it 
remains a window dressing ritual. Citizens are perceived as statistical abstractions and 
participation is measured by how many people come to meetings, take brochures home or 
answer a questionnaire. In placation, Arnstein explains to say that a degree of citizen 
participation is slightly seen and gives an example where a few handpicked ‘worthy’ poor are 
chosen on boards of agencies. The degree to which citizens are placated depends on two 
factors; the quality of technical assistance they have in articulating their priorities and the 
extent to which the communities have been organized to press for those priorities.  
On the upper levels of Arnstein’s rung is partnership, delegated power and citizen control 
(degree of citizen power), where citizens hear and are heard. At partnership level, power is 
redistributed through negotiation between the citizens and the power holders. Partnership 
work effectively where there is organized powerbase in the community to which the citizen 
leaders are accountable. Negotiations results in delegated power where citizens achieve 
dominant decision making authority over a particular plan or program. She argues that 
effective participation can only occur only on the last three rungs of the ladder where the state 
is prepared to enter into a partnership with interested and affected parties and power may be 
redistributed through negotiation between citizens and the power holder.101 At this level 
citizens are also able to achieve a dominant decision making authority where power is 
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delegated to them and in some programs they may even be in full control of all the policy and 
managerial aspects. 
The public and various interest groups are engaged at various levels in rulemaking processes 
of the tax administration in Malawi. It was reported by MRA that different avenues for 
engaging the public are used depending on the type of group they are dealing with. The 
different avenues were never clarified. It must be noted that there is no standardized 
procedure of engaging the public in rule making processes in Malawi and the avenues will 
thus depend on what the agency or a particular Ministry deems appropriate. MRA 
emphasized the importance of engaging the public that it does have an input in the quality 
and enforcement of rules that comes about. 
It is important to involve the public in coming up with rules because there are 
some things that we people in the office do not know about, the public has the 
hands on experience. It is just up to MRA to shape the policies to be in 
accordance with international as well as local interests and the interests of the 
sectors involved. For example we would involve environmental affairs 
department when considering issues that affect them so that we are not 
inconsistent with their interests. A senior officer at MRA. 
The agency reported that experience has taught them that when the public is involved, their 
ideas get accepted easily and they rarely encounter problems in implementing the rules unlike 
where the public was never engaged. Where the agency had not engaged the people it met 
resistance in various forms one of which was court injunctions. An example was given where 
the agency wanted to introduce a system to license clearing agents due to a lot of cheating 
and distortion of information by the agents. The initiative was not consultative and this 
affected implementation. 
One example in which the revenue administration gets the public to participate is through the 
pre-budget consultation meetings which are a yearly event. It was reported that in these 
meetings institutions such as the Malawi Chamber of Commerce and other associations make 
presentations outlining their proposals on revenue matters. That the proposals made are 
analyzed and considered by the agency. Most respondents indicated that these consultation 
meetings are open to the public and people who are interested can attend the meetings. Public 
engagement was said to be initiated by the agency or Minister of Finance in pre-budget 
consultation meetings. The public rarely initiates meetings with revenue authorities. The 
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consultation meetings are often held in Blantyre representing the southern region, Lilongwe 
for the central region and Mzuzu for the northern region. This excludes a majority of 
Malawians who live in other districts and especially those in remote areas. The agency 
reported that some programs within the organization have been implemented as a result of 
input from the public such as the introduction of 10% tax on airtime, payee threshold was 
also said to have had come from the public. Public engagement was said to be mainly made 
through the involvement of recognized bodies such as MCC and Bankers Association. The 
above raises concerns about adequate representation of the needs of the public in the above 
processes. It seems only well resourced societies afford to participate. Effective participation 
needs money, time, organization and expertise and there is always the risk that government 
will only respond only to the wealthy and the well-organized102. There is no systematic way 
of engaging the public let alone disadvantages groups in the nation. 
Further, it was reported that in some policy measures for example when devising rules of 
collecting tax, the agency does not consult the public. The public and other stakeholders will 
only be engaged to inform them about the tool and not to seek their input. Referring to the 
EFD for example most MRA officials said that they did not involve the public in coming up 
with the device. The officials said that there was no need to consult as it is just a 
methodology of collecting tax.  Using Arnstein ladder, it can be argued that public 
participation in rulemaking of the revenue administration is still an empty ritual of 
participation where the public have no real power to affect the outcome of the process. The 
Malawi tax administration seems to follow pluralism type of rulemaking as against civic 
republicanism. Pluralism as a theory regards laws and administrative decisions as the 
outcome of a process whereby decision makers are lobbied by various interest groups in 
society and then make decisions which ‘aggregate citizen preferences103.’ In Pluralism laws 
are seen as a commodity, subject to the forces of demand and supply. Pluralism is therefore 
committed to familiar conceptions of majority rule. On the other hand civic republicanism 
favours the situation in which decision makers stand back from the lobbying process and seek 
new information and different perspectives before making decisions. In civic republicanism 
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deliberation of issues among interested parties is encouraged rather than cutting deals with 
self-interested pressure groups104. 
Pluralism is evident in the Malawi tax administration where it was reported that, consultation 
of the public is done by dealing with the several sectors separately. The various sectors are 
not consulted together. It was also indicated that most of the times the individual sectors 
would want to advance their own interest which are mostly egoistic. The agency and the 
Ministry of Finance then have a role to balance all interests of the different sectors. However,  
most of the clearing agents at borders indicated that they are not consulted when new rules 
are being formulated. The agents bemoaned the legal process of clearance as very tedious, 
and the rates punitive, as a result, many of them turn to illegal and corrupt means of clearing 
goods, because it is faster and cheaper. The taxes were said to be very high, and that   
officials still charge taxes on goods of the value of less than a hundred thousand, contrary to 
the law. 
It is argued that public participation which takes a pluralism approach is not suited for a 
society which encompasses various categories of people with different levels of power and a 
wide gap between the rich and the poor. This is a situation which is obtaining in Malawi as 
such lots of people are left out in the rule making process and their needs not taken into 
account. 
4. 4.4 Access to Information on Revenue 
Accountability of governmental institutions is linked to their transparency.105Citizens need 
have access to information relating to the functioning of public bodies in many different 
contexts for example in how rules are made and in how matters are adjudicated. It was 
reported that MRA has a corporate department which its main functions is to advertise its 
activities and to get in touch with the public. The agency also has a website to share 
information with the public. The agency also produces different materials for the public on 
revenue e.g. brochures, leaflets and they do have newspaper, radio and TV adverts. These are 
produced both in Chichewa and English. It was said that reports are produced from the 
agency’s discussions with the public. All channels of communications were said to have 
contact numbers so that when people have issues they would be able to contact the agency. 
This was said to have enabled people to call directly to the agency’s head office or engage 
                                                          
104 Pierce, R. 1994. Public Policy Consensus Building: Connecting to Change for Capturing the Future.’ North 
Dakota Law Review. 311 
105 Leyland , P. et al. 2009. Textbook on Administrative law. Oxford University Press: United Kingdom.  
40 
 
their nearest MRA stations. The agency also has suggestion boxes and said to have benefited 
from valuable suggestions from the boxes. However, missing in the information that is 
imparted to the public is information relating to rule formulation and how the public can 
participate in that. Most of the information relates to enforcement mechanism, payment of tax 
and penalties for non-compliance in tax payment. 
Further, as regards adjudication, public participation in adjudicating disputes is problematic 
because of the complexity and multiplicity of dispute resolution bodies and the lack of 
available information to the public on the same. Members of the general public are not aware 
of the adjudicating bodies because they are ad hoc.  Public participation in adjudication is 
hampered by the fact the proceedings with the MRA are private hearing and hence not open 
to members of the general public. The findings made on various matters are kept internal and 
no member of the public would have access to them. The judgments on revenue matters are 
also private documents and where they are made public only matters of law and procedure 
can be included. This promotes lack of awareness. The complainants do not participate in the 
dispute resolution mechanisms because of need to pay duty before one can access a tribunal. 
Courts have also hindered public participation as they reinforce the exclusions of the 
members of the public from participating in adjudicative functions. In Siku Transport Limited 
v Malawi Revenue Authority, the court did not grant leave to the applicants. 
 
4. 4.5 Gender Considerations in Public Participation 
Public participation in rule making processes can only be effective and serve the public 
interest if and only if it seeks views of  all interested parties and affected parties and 
recognize the pluralistic sentiments of the community and open space for the ‘marginal’, the 
‘different’ and the ‘other’. Most of the times public participation processes have failed to 
address issues which impede women participation. Few women are in positions of authority 
and women are often represented in token numbers in influential positions106. This 
emphasizes on the need to scrutinize public participation processes in how they ensure that 
women are incorporated and meaningfully contribute in rule making processes. Gender issues 
was said not to be a big issue to MRA when coming up with tax laws, rules and policies. It 
was said that tax policies are supposed to apply equally across the board and as such they do 
not have deliberate policies to incorporate gender issues in the policies or laws. The agency 
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said that if they were to be approached by institutions such as NABW may be they would be 
gender specific. It was said that there was no room to favour particular groups such as women 
groups as fiscal incentives provided by the government do treat everyone equally. It was 
pointed out that in Malawi’s tax history, there used to be a minimum tax on males which they 
said was very discriminatory against men. Women therefore, are not particularly targeted in 
rule making processes. However, it was mentioned that certain areas of taxation have more 
women players than men and vice versa whilst other sectors are mixed. Thus the sectors 
themselves determine whether there is a gender dimension but the agency does not 
deliberately look for gender issues. An example was given where when the agency was about 
to introduce the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) women needs were considered. This was by 
simplifying the form which was being used at border posts to make it less complicated and 
involving as it was noted that due to the complexity people and women in particular used to 
shun the borders.  
 
4. 5 The Role and Impact of Judicial Review on the functions of  
Malawi Revenue Authority 
 
The Malawi Revenue Authority has been sued in judicial review proceedings concerning 
matters that relate to the decisions and orders of the Commissioner General on tax 
assessments and decisions made by the various adjudicative bodies under tax laws.  On the 
adjudication procedures and appeals provided by revenue laws, in the Siku Transport Limited 
v Malawi Revenue Authority107, leave was sought by the applicant for judicial review of the 
decision of the Commissioner with respect VAT assessments and an order of garnishee 
issued against the applicant. The Malawi Revenue Authority argued that the applicant had not 
exhausted the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under section 44 the VAT Act. 
The court held that the decision of the Commissioner General on the VAT assessments could 
not be subject to judicial review until the appeal processes provided by the VAT Act were 
exhausted.  
However, in the State, Commissioner General of Malawi Revenue Authority Ex-parte Bosco 
Ezekia Matale,108 the High Court in Mzuzu held that a party aggrieved by the decision of the 
                                                          
107 Commercial Case No 112 of 2013 
108 Civil Cause No. 92 of 2012 
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Commissioner General may move the High Court directly as the court has unlimited original 
jurisdiction according to section 108(1) of the Constitution and that section 46(2) of the 
Constitution of Malawi grants access to courts to any person who claims that their right has 
been violated. The court allowed the applicant to move the court for judicial review even 
though the appeal procedures as laid down under sections 120 and 121 of the Customs and 
Excise Act were not exhausted. In Malawi Revenue Authority v Abdul Karim Batatawala and 
other109, the court held an application for release of documents by the Malawi Revenue 
Authority which documents were seized under a search warrant. MRA raised an objection 
contending that the court had no jurisdiction as there was a judicial review matter before the 
High Court arising from the same facts. The court proceeded to hear the application and held 
that the appeal procedures laid down under the law are not stayed by mere commencement of 
judicial review proceedings. Thus, it will be noticed that the cases on judicial review have 
focused on the decision that has been made by the Commissioner General and the lack of 
adherence to the dispute resolution mechanisms placed by the tax laws. The judicial review 
cases do not relate generally to a challenge on the propriety of the rules or regulations made 
for purposes of efficient tax administration.  
 
The research made an inquiry on role and impact of judicial review on the conduct of the 
functions of MRA. It was observed that the Inland Revenue Officers, Border Station Offices 
and the lower ranking officials, despite being implementers of revenue laws, are not aware of 
the decisions that have been made in judicial review. The situation exist despite the fact that 
the decision are shared on the monthly bulletin’s circulated within MRA but the actual court 
judgments are not shared with all relevant departments. The Customs Division and the 
Domestic Tax Division further stated that the judgments from the court, not just on judicial 
review, do not reflect a proper understanding of the revenue laws. The Malawi Revenue 
Authority’s Legal Affairs Department handles cases on Judicial Review. The department is 
fully aware of the decisions made by the court but their interactions with other departments 
within MRA are limited. Other departments within the institution faulted the Legal 
Department for failing to appreciate complexities in revenue laws. The analysis evidences 
that that judicial review did not have a positive impact nor improve the quality of decision 
making within MRA. 
                                                          
109 Miscellaneous Application Number. 298 of 2013 
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5. Summary of Key Findings and Recommendation 
 
The purpose of the study was to determine how the Malawi Revenue Authority makes 
rules, apply rules and adjudicate disputes. Further the study wanted establishes the nature 
and forms of public participation in rule making and application and adjudication of 
disputes. Finally the study aimed at determining the role and impact of judicial review, 
parliamentary and presidential oversight on agency functions. This section highlights the 
key findings of the study as follows: 
5. 1 Rule-Making 
 
 The actors that are involves in revenue law making are the Ministry of Finance 
and the Malawi Revenue Authority- Headquarters and these have been 
empowered under the law to propose amendments to revenue laws in order to 
facilitate efficient administration of tax. It is noted that the members of the 
organised society such as professional bodies and NGO do participate in the law 
making processes. However, public or citizen participation in law making is 
limited as no mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that the ordinary and 
indigent citizens in Malawi participate in revenue law making. The Malawi 
Revenue Authority exclusively conducts the revenue rule making functions 
without engaging the general populace 
 There is a multiplicity of law/rule making processes and mechanisms and that 
does not further public participation, openness, accountability and good 
governance.  
 There is further technocratic autonomy in rule making due to complexity of tax 
laws and the general citizenry is assumed to be technically incompetent to 
effectively participate in revenue matters  
 There is over deference to the Ministry of Finance in revenue law making and 
parliamentary oversight is ineffective to cure defects that occur in revenue law 
making and this affects the legitimacy of  revenue laws 
 
 There are political interferences in revenue law-making hence the taking into 




5. 2 Rule Application 
 
 The complexity of tax laws have led to difficulties in implementation and 
resultantly, the extent of citizen participation in revenue rule/law implementation 
is minimal.  
 The Commissioner General has been given vast powers under revenue laws to 
make decisions. However, there is lack of judicious exercise of discretion as the 
Commissioner General has made decisions that are influenced by political and 
executive. Further, decision-making that is politically influenced makes other 
categories of the citizenry to be above the law. The malpractice does not further 
good governance. 
 There several actors are involved in rule application and the same have been 
mandated by law. Of concern are the Clearing Agents who are essentially a link 
between the general citizenry and the MRA officials. Clearing Agents have 
furthered malpractices such as corruption and fraud. 
 
5. 3 Adjudication 
 
 There is a multiplicity of actors and processes in revenue adjudication and some 
of the bodies are not available and accessible in practice. The situation does not 
further democratic governance. 
 The Committees that mainly hear disputes on behalf of the Controller of Customs 
and Commissioner of Taxes and whose decision is then confirmed by the 
Commissioner General have no legal basis under the law. 
 The revenue laws embody principles procedure fairness to larger extent as a tax 
payer is given an opportunity to adduce evidence, to be represented by a legal 
practitioner and to be heard in the conduct of the case.  
 In practice, the right to be heard is not accorded to a tax payer. Tax payers at the 
border or Inland Revenue officers who lodge complaints are mandated to do so in 
writing and they are not present during the actual determination of their case. 
Appeals Committees that are set up at MRA adjudicate on matters and these are 
not sanctioned by revenue laws. 
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 The rule against bias is also violated under the law as the Commissioner or 
Controller may sit on appeals when a decision being challenged was essentially 
made on their behalf by their delegates. 
 The revenue laws do not allow for public participation in adjudication and the 
records on appeals are kept confidential. The situation does not further 
transparency, openness and accountability in revenue decision making. 
 Adjudicators have also been given wide discretion to adopt their own rules of 
procedure. The same have not taken into account principles of procedural fairness. 
 
5. 4 Public Participation 
 
 There is administrative autonomy in revenue matters and that impedes on 
meaningful engagement with the general populace 
 MRA adopts indirect participation as professional bodes and NGO represent the 
interest of the citizens and pluralism is also evident where consultations are done 
by dealing with several sectors but separately. 
 Gender is not a key consideration in revenue decision making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
